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ABSTRACT 
We explore the process of professionalization pre- and post- buyout (MBO) 
or buyin (MBI) of former private family firms using longitudinal evidence 
from six UK family firms undergoing an MBO/I in 1998. Professionalization 
behaviour was monitored up to 2014. Previous studies have 
conceptualized professionalization as a threshold to be attained. We 
demonstrate that professionalization is a complex process occurring in 
waves, triggered by changes in firm ownership and management.  Waves 
of professionalization converge during the MBO/I process. Buyouts provide 
a funnelling mechanism enabling diverse control systems to be 
standardized. Post-MBO/I, divergence in the professionalization process 
reoccurs contingent on firm-specific contexts.  Professionalization focuses 
on operations when stewardship relationships predominate, but on agency 
control mechanisms when there is increased potential for agency costs.  
Buyout organizational form is an important transitory phase facilitating the 
professionalization process. Professionalization is not a once for all 
development stage. 
KEYWORDS 
family firms; professionalization; management buyout; stewardship; agency 
JEL CLASSFICATION 
D21; G32; G34; M10. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite most firms being family owned or controlled, family managers are 
often assumed to be non-professional and contrasted with non-family 
‘professional’ managers (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008).  However, some family 
managers may be highly educated and skilled, whereas some non-family 
managers may not (Stewart and Hitt, 2012). Regardless, studies of family 
firms focus on introducing non-family managers as a route to 
professionalization (Dekker et al., 2015). Despite concerns (Stewart and 
Hitt, 2012) engagement in professionalization has been reduced to a binary 
variable.  Dekker et al., (2015) assert that professionalization needs to be 
conceptualized as a multi-faceted process.  
Professionalization is seen as a threshold stage that firms need to attain to 
progress.  Professionalized firms are assumed better able to circumvent 
business development barriers; with the management style and 
organizational structure to ensure firm growth.  However, few studies have 
examined the dynamic professionalization process.  Even with a multi-
faceted professionalization process approach, professionalization is often 
reduced to a checklist in cross-sectional studies exploring the link between 
professionalization propensity and variations in firm performance (Dekker 
et al., 2015). Cross-sectional studies provide limited insights into causal 
process relationships, being limited to analysing the co-existence of 
specific variables (Yildirim-Öktem and Üsdiken, 2010).  Professionalization 
does not happen overnight (Dekker et al., 2015).  We need, therefore, to 
understand the temporal dynamics of the process of professionalization in 
private family-owned firms before conclusions can be drawn about 
causality because few studies have explored the process (Hall and 
Nordqvist, 2008; De Massis, Chirico, Kotlar, and Naldi, 2014).  
Lack of understanding is partly due to the dearth of longitudinal analysis.  
Longitudinal studies are warranted to explore whether current 
conceptualizations of professionalization are appropriate for family firms 
(Stewart and Hitt, 2012).  We examine longitudinal cases of six UK private 
family firms over 16 years.  Professionalization is monitored before, during 
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and after management buyout (MBO) or buyin (MBI).  By examining 
buyouts of private family firms, we view a discrete event relating to 
ownership and management changes. The MBO/I context contributes to 
understanding of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2012), and where the 
buyout may facilitate professionalization in former private family firms to 
enable future venture growth.  The selection of extreme cases where the 
former family owners and managers left  the firms to different extents over 
time enabled examination of ‘how’ the professionalization process evolved 
in a context of decreasing family involvement (De Massis and Kotlar, 
2014).  In relation to the research gap concerning the process of 
professionalization in family firms over time, we explore the following 
research question: 
Q1. How does the professionalization process evolve pre- and post-
MBO/I in former private family firms? 
The cases were privately family-owned and family-managed to a greater or 
lesser extent prior to MBO or MBI.  Attitudes, goals and behaviour were 
monitored before, during and after the buyout.  This provided the 
opportunity to examine how the professionalization process evolved, and 
how family exit and an increase in external influences lead to changes in 
management controls and processes associated with ‘professional’ 
management. 
Most MBO/Is involve private largely family-owned firms (CMBOR, 2014) 
with incumbent managers taking over ownership from the former owner-
manager(s).  The MBO team sometimes includes next generation family 
members.  MBIs involve a new external management ownership team and 
can be viewed as a distinct move towards professionalization (Gilligan and 
Wright, 2014).  Post-buyout the new ownership team could introduce more 
formal governance mechanisms, greater use of planning and control 
systems, and involvement of non-family board members.  MBO/Is may also 
be used to remove some family members who wish to retire, or do not 
contribute to future firm development (Howorth et al., 2004).  Family firm 
owners may select an MBO to enables them to exit and realize their 
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investment whilst ensuring some continuity of the former dominant family 
ethos, particularly if some family members retain positions in the firm.  
Stewardship relationships may continue post-MBO/I. 
We make the following contributions.  First, we provide fresh insights into 
how professionalization evolves and how the professionalization process 
varies in private family firms involved in MBO/Is.  Second, we illustrate that 
professionalization is a process occurring in waves, which intensify with 
firm ownership and management changes.  The MBO/I is an important 
transitory phase enabling former family firms to introduce formalized 
management control systems.  Conceptually, the buyout presents a 
funnelling mechanism whereby systems and controls are standardized.  
Third, we highlight that post-MBO/I increased variation in control systems 
and processes are contingent upon different types of ownership change, 
and levels of continuing family involvement associated with the relative 
importance of long or short-term goals.  Fourth, we integrate insights from 
agency and stewardship theories. We conceptualize how the relevance of 
stewardship and agency constructs change over time, shaping the nature 
and form of the professionalization process.  Fifth, we contribute to 
understanding how family firms balance the best aspects of 
professionalization and stewardship cultures in their control systems and 
processes. Succession through MBO/I provides a juncture whereby the 
former private family firm maintains its independent ownership and sustains 
the stewardship culture, albeit in a metamorphosed state.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Family firm professionalization involves utilization of formal governance 
mechanisms and strategic planning and control systems, plus involvement 
of non-family members on the board and in the management team.  
Involvement of ‘outside’ professionals can bring fresh objectivity to 
decision-making (Ibrahim et al., 2001).  It is wrong to assume that all family 
managers are inherently not professional (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008).  
Despite numerous studies, there is no consensus relating to whether family 
managers benefit family firms (Minichilli et al., 2010). There is growing 
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acknowledgement that the dominant view of professionalized family 
business management is overly simplistic when it focuses on non-family 
manager employment (Dekker et al., 2015), notwithstanding desires to 
preserve socioemotional wealth and shortcomings relating to family 
management (Colombo et al., 2014).  
Life-cycle theorists suggest introducing formal management control 
systems is critical for firm development.  Threshold firms are those around 
the point of transition from entrepreneurial to professional management 
(Daily and Dalton, 1992: 25).  Entrepreneurial management involves 
founder centrality, ad hoc planning and control, informal structures, basic 
budgeting, and a ‘loosely defined family-oriented culture’.  
Professionalization is associated with an increase in management control 
systems and processes formalizing management. Many studies adopt a 
simplistic and narrow conceptualization of professionalization regarding 
employment of non-family managers (Chrisman et al., 2013). A rare 
longitudinal study (Lien and Li, 2014) concluded that post-initial public 
offering (IPO) family firms should combine family control with professional 
(i.e. non-family) management to improve performance. A multi-faceted 
examination of family firm professionalization is warranted.  Professional 
management relates to cultural and formal competence regarding family or 
non-family managers (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008).  Appreciation of 
dimensions of professionalization has enabled identification of different 
types of family firms (Dekker et al., 2015). Professionalization relates to 
rights to use specialized knowledge, and morals, capability and integrity of 
individuals (Stewart and Hitt, 2012), rather than increasing bureaucracy 
(Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). Studies generally provide little understanding of 
how professionalization evolves and how the professionalization process 
might vary. In particular, contingent factors influencing the 
professionalization process have been neglected. Contingency-based 
research examines links between structure and processes of management 
control systems, and contextual variables associated with uncertainty and 
external environmental complexity (Otley, 1988).  Control systems can 
relate more to firm specific contingencies post-MBO because as MBOs 
place increased emphasis on operational efficiency and planning (Jones, 
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1992).  Yildirim-Öktem and Üsdiken (2010) found power and institutional 
perspectives were more appropriate than contingency theory to explore the 
professionalization of family business group boards, measured as 
governance structure variables rather than control systems and processes. 
However, the nature of board professionalization can be contingent upon 
the absorptive capacity of firm founders seeking to cross the 
professionalization threshold (Zahra et al., 2009). The impact of 
professionalization on post-succession performance in family owned firms 
may be contingent upon whether succession is to a family member or a 
nonfamily professional manager (Chittoor and Das, 2007). Effecting such 
changes may require fundamental changes to organizational processes, 
values and culture because they may challenge the legacy of the founder 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2004).  
We develop a contingency-based approach by drawing on agency and 
stewardship theories.  These theories enable greater insights into different 
influences within the ownership and management structures shaping the 
professionalization process in former private family firms that selected 
MBO/Is (Howorth et al., 2004; Bruining, et al., 2013).  We conceptualize 
how the relevance of stewardship and agency constructs change over time, 
shaping the nature and form of the professionalization process.  
Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been used in understanding interactions between family 
owners and non-family managers and in MBO/Is of family firms (Chrisman 
et al., 2012).  Chrisman et al., (2004) noted that strategic planning 
influenced the performance of non-family firm’s more than family firms, 
implying lower agency costs in family-owned firms.  Studies across the 
MBO life-cycle provide evidence for the validity of an agency perspective 
(Bruton et al., 2002) showing that post-buyout increased entrepreneurial 
and administrative management increased the likelihood of private equity 
(PE) investment. 
Family firms are not homogeneous because they vary in terms of goals, 
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ownership and management structures (Westhead and Howorth, 2007; 
Kotlar and De Massis, 2013).  Some family firms face agency problems 
much earlier than others. For some family firms, introducing governance 
and management mechanisms may reduce potential conflicts of interest 
between family and non-family owners and managers, and may control 
agency problems arising from altruism or nepotism (Schulze et al., 2003). 
Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship relationships are associated with the stereotypical family firm 
(Schulze et al., 2003).  Social rather than formal controls may be used 
where there is high goal alignment (Pieper et al., 2008).  With a strong 
stewardship culture in a family firm, formal management controls 
associated with professionalization may be inappropriate (Stewart and Hitt, 
2012).  Some elements of this may prevail post-MBO/I to restrict the 
professionalization process.  However, introduction of a PE investor may 
lead to a greater preponderance of agency relationships and precipitate the 
professionalization process. 
Summary of Theoretical Insights  
Contingency-based approaches have been criticized for overemphasizing 
external context (Otley, 1988) rather than the role of internal culture, as 
embodied in agency and stewardship perspectives, which is a key theme in 
family firm studies.  Prior studies provide limited perspectives on 
thresholds, succession and professionalization.  This is because they focus 
on ways of effecting succession while retaining family ownership in relation 
to succession as a one-off event.  Limited examination of internal and 
external influences on professionalization structures in family firms (i.e. 
narrow focus on governance variables) may, in part, explain the claim that 
contingency theory may have minimal explanatory power (Yildirim-Öktem 
and Üsdiken, 2010).  However, this may not be the case regarding 
professionalization processes.  We provide fresh insights regarding the 
appropriateness of a contingency-based approach to explore internal and 
external firm issues shaping the professionalization process in private firms 
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pre- and post-MBO/I.  The buyout retains family ownership but involves a 
more fundamental break with the past than succession.  Monitoring firms 
post-MBO/I enables longer-term examination of challenges in making 
changes to processes, values and cultures, which is missing in prior 
studies.  We hold constant key contextual variables to isolate the effect(s) 
of changes in family ownership and management on the professionalization 
process in firms over time.  Notably, we highlight links between the 
presence and exit of former family owners and managers due to the MBO/I, 
and the nature and form of professionalization processes pre- and post-
MBO/I. 
Agency theory suggests that as firm ownership and management are 
diluted through a MBO/I, there will be increased need to professionalize to 
control agency costs.  Stewardship theory indicates that examination of 
motivations, relationships and information asymmetries may shed light on 
variations in the professionalization process, and the use of formal and/or 
social controls.  Prior to MBO/I, family firms where stewardship 
relationships prevail may have greater use of informal methods and social 
controls.  The MBO/I may increase formalization, particularly with PE firm 
involvement.  A longitudinal qualitative approach enables exploration of 
these complex interactions between multiple factors relating to internal and 
external environments.  A contingency-based approach building upon 
insights from agency and stewardship theories provides understanding of 
how the professionalization process evolves, particularly variations related 
to shifts in agency and stewardship constructs due to changes in family 
and non-family ownership and management. 
METHOD 
We adopt the logic of inductive inquiry that allows new theoretical insights 
to emerge through the process of gathering data from multiple sources, 
analysing that data through comparison, and iterating between emerging 
conceptual insights and re-examination of the data (Yin, 2013; Reay, 2014; 
De Massis and Kotlar, 2014; Fletcher et al., 2015).  A longitudinal study 
was conducted involving six UK family firms undergoing a MBO/I.  MBO/Is 
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provide ‘extreme cases’ (Siggelkow, 2007) for studying family firm 
professionalization because they involve a discrete event where family 
ownership and management changes to non-family.  Data were collected 
at MBO/I in 1998 and subsequently from key informants up to 2014 as 
detailed below.  Company reports, financial data, ownership and 
management data and media coverage were obtained across the period 
1998 to 2014. 
Case Selection 
For the initial selection, we administered a postal questionnaire to all 
MBO/Is completed in 1998 from the Centre for Management Buyout 
Research (CMBOR) database, which effectively comprises the UK MBO/I 
population.  From survey respondents agreeing to a follow-up interview, we 
identified cases that, prior to MBO/I, met the European Union definition for 
private family firms as over 50% of shares were owned by a single family 
group related by blood or marriage, family were involved in management 
and the business was perceived as a family business (Westhead and 
Cowling, 1998).  We employed theoretical sampling to select respondents 
with distinct differences (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) that ex ante 
might be expected to provide variations in the professionalization process.  
Further, we sought first and multi-generation firms because the depth of 
family experience can increase if more generations of the dominant family 
are involved in the firm (Astrachan et al., 2002); stewardship may have 
stronger roots and be more likely to prevail.  We included MBOs and MBIs 
because the former includes managers from within the firm and the latter 
involves external managers who may be perceived as being ‘professional’ 
managers.  The survey data also allowed us to identify cases with varying 
levels of family involvement post-MBO/I.  Level of involvement of family 
members may shape pre- and post-MBO/I behaviour.  Crucially, continuity 
of some family involvement may be associated with fewer changes post-
MBO/I.   
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Data Collection 
Multiple sources of evidence enabled data to be cross-checked, improving 
consistency and reliability.  The initial survey provided information on the 
family and the firm, perceived reasons for MBO/I, the deal, and changes in 
structure and strategy.  Face-to-face interviews with vendors and acquirers 
in 2000/1 gathered information on motivations of family firm owners and 
MBO/I teams, antecedents, the deal process, and changes post-MBO/I.  
Face-to-face and telephone interviews with surviving firms in 2006 and 
2014 explored changes in structure, operations and strategy.  Interviews 
comprised open questions to avoid leading interviewees focusing on 
changes since the previous data collection point.  Five firms interviewed in 
2001 were re-interviewed in 2006.  One firm was not re-interviewed in 2006 
due to closure.  In 2014, ownership and management data on all six firms 
were obtained for the period pre-MBO/I to 2014.  Moreover, in 2014, of 
surviving firms interviewed in 2006, one was interviewed extensively 
because the family still had a role in 2006, and a further two confirmed their 
current status by telephone.  The fourth was the subject of extensive media 
coverage following a criminal court case against the two family directors.  
This firm was closed and subsequently sold in 2012 following their 
conviction. The fifth surviving firm was acquired in 2006.  By obtaining data 
across the 16 years period up to 2014, we examined all firms beyond final 
exit of vendor families.  
Nineteen interviews were held, separately, with multiple respondents from 
each firm over time.  Respondents included former family owners, 
members of the MBO/I teams, managers and senior employees.  Three 
interviews included two co-interviewees.  Four people were interviewed on 
multiple occasions.  Each one to two hour interview was recorded and 
transcribed verbatim.  Anonymized case characteristics are provided in 
Table 1. 
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Data Analysis Method 
Data analysis was based on interpretive methods.  Key concepts and 
understandings were developed from subjects’ interpretations.  Interview 
transcripts from 2001, 2006 and 2014 were analysed manually using a 
three-stage process of description, inference and explanation.  Manual 
coding and analysis were employed, facilitating identification of causal links 
and key concepts.  Transcripts were coded and analysed using pattern-
coding, tables and matrices.  The first author undertook initial analysis and 
coding.  Interpretations were checked with interviewees.  Patterns and 
inferences were discussed between authors.  Manual analysis allowed 
interviews to be read as a whole and to be critically considered within 
context.  Data analysis aimed to identify themes, consistencies or 
paradoxes regarding two ordered steps:  first-order analysis examined 
professionalization as firms went through changes in ownership and 
management, while second-order analysis involves development of 
conceptual insights through analytical generalization.  Examples of data 
and early stage analysis are available in the online only appendix. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The professionalization processes were compared alongside changes in 
ownership and management post-MBO/I.  Levels of family ownership and 
management declined post-MBO/I in all firms except TROLLEYS, which 
increased family ownership and was fully owned by the next generation of 
the original family six years post-MBO. Interviewees evidenced views that 
polarized professional and family firms, consistent with earlier studies 
suggesting professionalization is simply the introduction of non-family 
management. Some non-family interviewees suggested family firms were 
the antithesis of ‘professional’ or ‘proper’ firms.  “I think the company’s run 
more professionally now… In family firms there’s a lot of bickering and 
things… It’s not tolerated in a proper company” (PLANTS EMPLOYEE 
2006).  Here, the MBO/I was presented as having legitimized the family 
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firm.  Interestingly, the externally appointed managing director (MD)1 of 
PLANTS stated (2001) “Actually the business had pretty good controls and 
systems, the one strength of it before I came in was the systems were 
good”.  For some, being a family firm was not something to be proud of.  
The MD of TROLLEYS (in 2006) did not consider his firm to be a family 
business, despite being a second generation family member, and the 
business being owned fully by himself and his sister.  Negative 
connotations of family business were more prevalent among firms 
managed very ad hoc pre-MBO/I which reported few formal controls and 
processes.  In all these cases (PLANTS, PIPES and TROLLEYS), the firms 
were previously owner-managed, and dominated by one individual.  A 
contra effect involved some non-family managers joining the smaller former 
private family firms, in part, due to prior negative experience of 
‘professional’ management in large companies.  These differences indicate 
a dichotomized view of family versus ‘professional’ management is an over-
simplification of the professionalization process. 
Professionalization in family firms pre-MBO/I 
Contrary to life-cycle perspectives, there were no discernible patterns in 
professionalization relative to firm size or age.  The largest firms (DUMPS 
and PLANTS) and the oldest (PIPES) reported ad hoc and unsystematic 
management pre-MBO/I. This highlights that professionalization does not 
happen automatically as family firms grow, and suggests other factors 
influence the professionalization process.  
Within-case and cross-case analysis identified variation in levels and focus 
of professionalization pre-MBO/I.  Nearly all cases indicated owner-centric 
management and non-participatory leadership processes pre-MBO/Is.  For 
example, “The guy who ran the business knew everything, could do 
everybody’s job better than they could” (PLANTS MD); and “It was a one-
                                               
1 MD = Commonly used term relating to privately held firms in the UK, and is 
equivalent to Chief Executive Officer. 
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man band in a way” (PLANTS VENDOR).  Vendors, employees, MBO/I 
team members and family members provided evidence of non-participatory 
leadership.     
Cases varied in their introduction of external (non-family) managers: “I’d 
tried to bring in senior people and for one reason or another it hadn’t 
worked” (PLANTS, VENDOR 2001); “He had a number of contractor 
directors…and they were highly incentivized…that’s how he had grown the 
business” (DUMPS MD 2001).  A shared leadership model was observed in 
LOCKS, where the Chair was a family owner and the MD was appointed 
externally some year’s pre-MBO.   
Variation in management control processes pre-MBO/Is ranged from non-
existent to sophisticated use: “We’ve got very good financial management 
controls in place (which) we’ve built up over many years….There weren’t a 
lot of additional things (i.e. changes post MBO)” (LOCKS MD 2001), 
compared with: “What used to happen, because [family owners] had loads 
of money… [family owner] would just wander round the warehouse, if the 
bin was empty he’d just go away and order a pallet load of those fittings 
and then he could forget about it for six months” (PIPES ACC 2001).  
Fewer management control processes were associated with the most 
owner-centric family firms.   
Introduction of management control processes occurred incrementally over 
many years, suggesting professionalization was not a single action event.  
Cross-case analysis indicated the validity of a contingency-based 
explanation of why some firms were slower to professionalize.  For 
example, PIPES had ‘plenty of cash’; BOXES’ ‘sales were good’; and 
PLANTS was well-placed as the leading supplier in their industry.  Firms 
with fewer management control processes (PIPES) tended to have less 
uncertainty and complexity, particularly in their sales environment and were 
in slow-changing, low-technology industries. Firms with more management 
controls and processes pre-MBO/I (LOCKS) were in more complex 
industries, facing greater sales uncertainty.  Stewardship relationships 
might increase internal certainty within private family firms, and thus be 
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associated with fewer formal management controls and less likelihood to 
seek managers externally.   
Professionalization in preparation for exit and succession 
The MBO/I boosted the professionalization process, forming part of exit 
preparations in some firms.  External advisers were employed in all cases.  
Firms preparing for MBI were more likely to implement new processes than 
those preparing for MBO.  Also, firms targeting PE funding were more likely 
to put new processes and structures in place pre-MBO/I.  For example: “He 
[vendor] dressed it up a little bit, for example, did he have a business 
development manager?  Yes he did but only just, he’d just appointed him, 
probably after he’d started speaking to me” (DUMPS, MD 2001).  LOCKS 
and BOXES, not funded by PE, placed greater emphasis on knowledge 
transfer pre- and post-MBO.  Both paid less attention to management 
control processes, and ‘window dressing’.   Private family firms preparing 
for MBO/I appear more likely to boost the professionalization process when 
it is anticipated that buying teams will include members external to the 
family firm (e.g. PE investor, MBI team), in line with agency theoretic 
notions of signalling. 
Professionalization post-MBO/I 
Without prompting, interviewees used the word ‘professional’ in discussing 
changes post-MBO/I.  BOXES thought they were “more professional in 
what they do”.  Three cases introduced ‘external’ MDs.  In each, the MDs 
talked about professionalizing as making improvements reflecting their 
experience in larger companies (i.e. decentralizing control).  The MD and 
lead member of the MBI team in DUMPS stated they intended to “get this 
team and manage it professionally…give people more authority…more 
freedom”.  An employee in PLANTS, mentioned earlier, stated that the 
company was “run more professionally now”.  To confirm her view, the 
former family owner’s attitude is exemplified in describing the incoming 
MBO team as follows: “They did… business planning, all this sort of 
rubbish”.  The new MD of PLANTS stated the importance of bringing in 
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“professional management”, but explained that employees placed a low 
value on his management experience compared to knowing the names of 
all the plants.   
Within-case analysis showed the MBO/I led to increased 
professionalization across every firm.  Where not already in place, the 
MBO/I triggered an increased focus on profitability, more control processes,  
performance-related rewards, formal governance structure, participative 
leadership, changes in organization structures, and more strategic 
planning.  There was considerable consistency of mechanisms adopted 
immediately post-MBO/I.  All firms without monthly management accounts 
introduced them post-MBO/I, irrespective of type of MBO/I funding.   
LOCKS had formal structures and systems pre-MBO, but post-MBO, there 
was increased decentralization, changes in management structure, and 
formalization of governance roles. 
The professionalization process was implemented through personnel 
changes: “so the team was changed” [PLANTS MD 2006 discussing 1999]; 
and structure changes “engineering business is [now] split into three [with] 
their own operating budgets and financial targets and controls” (LOCKS 
MD 2001].  Training and staff development were emphasized to enable 
professionalization processes: “We’ve trained all the sales staff, trained the 
admin staff, a bit more discipline in terms of administration, rules and 
regulations, health and safety, to try and help develop the people” 
(TROLLEYS MD 2001). All firms, except TROLLEYS, had an external 
board representative.  In some (PIPES and PLANTS), PE investors 
appointed external MDs.  PLANTS and PIPES suffered difficulties due to 
poor management skills of second-generation family members who wished 
to be involved post-MBO/I.  These firms brought in external MDs within two 
year’s post-MBO/I.  In both, this was the major trigger for increased 
professionalization.  For PIPES, this included replacing ‘stock control by 
wandering’ with management and stock control processes plus 
computerized invoicing.   
In several firms, where professionalization led to tightening up of slack, 
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there was some employee resistance, notably when firms attempted to link 
bonuses to performance (DUMPS and PIPES).  Clearly, there is potential 
for self-interest in private family firms and non-family firms.  
MBO/Is introduced an additional layer of complexity due to the financial risk 
of debt in the deal structure.  Contingency-based research has associated 
such factors with an increase in management control systems (Jones, 
1992).  PE investors especially bring the firm into a new agency 
relationship.  There can be strict requirements for control systems and 
higher leverage requires closer monitoring of cash flow.  MBI teams, as 
outsiders, are more likely to experience uncertainty due to asymmetric 
information challenges and associated agency relationships within the firm.  
To address these issues they, therefore, introduce agency controls.   
In sum, the MBO/I acts like a ‘funnelling mechanism’ shaping the 
professionalization process post-MBO/I.  Despite divergence in former 
private family firms pre-MBO/I, there is considerable convergence of 
professionalization post-MBO/I.  Irrespective of background, post-MBO/I 
firms exhibited considerable consistency in governance structures, control 
systems and processes introduced. Personnel changes were important in 
driving professionalization.  
Later years: post-family exit 
To examine patterns in changes in professionalization beyond the 
transition period post-MBO/I we analysed the period 8 to 16 years post-
MBO/I.  By 2006, consistent with PE time horizons (Gilligan and Wright, 
2014), PE firms had exited most firms.  Vendor families varied in their 
involvement post-MBO/I.  By 2006, only TROLLEYS and LOCKS still had 
vendor family involvement.  Further ownership changes were common-
place, often in a move towards ownership consolidation.  There was no 
discernible pattern concerning the vendor family concluding exit, and the 
introduction of further professionalization.  By 2014, LOCKS had no family 
involvement, and formal management structures were more relaxed. “It’s 
disintegrated…until 2013…very formal systems…we don’t meet as often as 
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we used to” (LOCKS, MD, 2014).  In contrast, other firms introduced more 
formal systems when family involvement ended (PLANTS and BOXES).  
Introduction of formal control processes led to exit of remaining family 
member in PIPES. 
Eight years post-MBO/I, and after PE investor exit, data show further 
waves and ripples of professionalization, but with a shift in emphasis, and 
considerable variation among firms.  The professionalization process over 
this time period emphasized more strategic planning, financial planning, 
training and development, innovation and culture changes.  Control 
systems and processes were now discussed in terms of ‘how’ they were 
used rather than ‘what they consisted of’ highlighted in earlier interviews.  
For example, the company director of BOXES had previously discussed 
budget minutiae, but now emphasized how the tools were used, and how 
they helped him understand what was going on.  Interviewees illustrated 
increased taken-for-granted mastery over controls and systems.  The 
professionalization process was enhanced by interviewees’ stronger views 
about what worked.  Interviewees were also more open about when they 
got something wrong.  Interestingly, by this stage there was divergence 
because some firms no longer used external directors.  “We had one guy 
who was a non-executive director, we got to a point that we felt we didn’t 
need him…  ..After we talked to the bank they felt comfortable that we were 
as a team, perhaps experienced enough not to need that” (BOXES MD 
2006); “[PE] think they’ve got their man in and actually, you know, he’s 
90% on your side… When he first came in we’d have a pre-board meeting 
so he didn’t effectively manage the board …By the time he left it was a 2 
hour board meeting looking at strategy and real issues” (PLANTS MD 
2006); and “[Non-executive directors] No never have done.  I think there 
was lots of pressure from the VC back…. but we just dug our heels in and 
said no… We do have an external guy we work with… we have a formal 
meeting with him every two months, off-site, fixed agenda, minutes, …and 
it works very well” (TROLLEYS MD 2006). 
In 2006, there was more evidence of elements associated with stewardship 
relationships than observed immediately post-MBO/I.  Interviewees 
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reported high identification with the organization, involvement oriented, low 
power distance cultures, and a tendency to put the business’ objectives 
above personal ones.  Centralization of management highlighted in 
surviving firms appeared associated with strong firm attachment and 
longer-term goals.  For example, “For me, it’s a long-term thing you know.  
I’ve worked here pretty much since I left college and… it’s my life…. I love 
it.  So, …I’m here for the long haul” (BOXES, internal MD, 2006).  
Interviewees brought in as ‘external’ MDs, however, showed less 
attachment and shorter-term goals: “Actually I’m doing a job, it’s not an 
extension of my personality” (PLANTS, external MD, 2006). 
The professionalization process was linked to changes in organizational 
culture.  For example, “the big challenge was changing it from a family 
culture to a….. professional culture…we were able to instil in people that 
they were part of the team.  Their job wasn’t to do what [family owner] said, 
their job was to offer their skills, their intelligence to do the best job they 
could” (PLANTS MD 2006).  However, the same interviewee went onto 
highlight a reversion to a ‘family culture’: “over the last seven years, we’ve 
removed [PE] as a shareholder… and it’s almost come full circle back to 
being almost like the family business again… but with a different culture”.  
The interviewee indicated the firm had achieved a balance between the 
best aspects of professional and family cultures, but “the one thing I’ve got 
to be aware of is that I don’t just start slowly dripping in, what’s wrong 
about a family business back into it” (PLANTS MD 2006). 
In line with contingency-based approaches, analysis suggests once 
standard control processes associated with professionalization were in 
place, firms adapted and developed in diverse directions, depending on 
individual circumstances.  Firm goals also shaped the professionalization 
process.  For example, LOCKS’ MD in 2014 took a long-term view: 
“Constantly thinking about succession planning…always had this cycle, this 
up and down cycle…we’ve persevered...we’ve spent 10 years developing 
new products for different markets and these are sustainable” (LOCKS, 
MD, 2014).  The emphasis was on introducing management processes 
concerning product quality control and product development.  In contrast, 
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PIPES, had a clear goal to sell the firm.  Here, management control 
processes remained tight in order to maintain firm saleability.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Findings 
Our analysis shows that ‘threshold’ conceptualisations of a once-for-all shift 
from entrepreneurialism to professionalization are an oversimplification.  
Table 2 summarizes our main findings, highlighting that professionalization 
is a process rather than an event, occurring in waves of varying sizes and 
foci.  Despite variations in level and focus pre-MBO/I, professionalization 
increased post-MBO/I characterized by convergence  with firms  reporting 
comparable levels of formalization and introduction of similar controls. 
Figure 1 represents this funnelling effect on the professionalization process 
that generally resulted in adoption of standardized management control 
processes post-MBO/I.  Figure 1 and Table 2 also demonstrate the 
continuation of the professionalization process post-MBO/I over many 
years.  Figure 1 illustrates that pre-MBO/I there was considerable variation 
in levels and foci of professionalization, contingent on the specific context 
of each firm.  Stewardship relationships moderated the contingency 
imperative in that where stewardship relationships were strong, fewer 
formal controls and therefore less professionalization was evident.  In 
preparing for MBO/I, Figure 1 shows that professionalization through 
formalization increases.  Where sale is to external parties (MBI), signalling 
is more relevant; furthermore professionalization at this stage is moderated 
by the type of funding as PE investors might have greater information 
asymmetry, and signalling becomes more important than with debt funding.  
Thus, agency theory dominates explanations of professionalization at this 
stage. During and immediately after MBO/I, analysis showed increasing 
and standardization of professionalization.  This funnelling effect is driven 
by increased involvement of external, non-family managers and investors 
and is moderated by levels of uncertainty and risk faced by individual firms; 
greater uncertainty and risk strengthens the effect of external managers 
and investors on professionalization.  In later stages post-MBO/I, Figure 1 
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illustrates the greater divergence observed as firms continued to 
professionalize in directions contingent on their own individual 
circumstances, internally and externally. 
Changes in ownership and management triggered ‘waves of 
professionalization’.  Notably, in later years, specific variations in ownership 
or management could lead to a focus on operational controls, or agency 
control mechanisms.  We detect that agency theory alone does not fully 
explain changes in management control systems and processes.  
Stewardship relationships were associated with emphasis on operational 
control processes to manage the business, rather than agency controls to 
align motivations.  Longer-term stewardship relationships re-emerged once 
agency relationships had been reduced, for example, following exit of 
financial investors. 
Figure 2 highlightspresents the drivers and moderators of different 
professionalization waves, illustrating most powerfully that drivers and 
moderators differ across waves.  Figures 1 and 2 emphasize the value of 
employing complementary theories to understand changes in 
professionalization over time.  By utilizing a longitudinal approach, we 
extend insights from relatively narrow cross-sectional contingency-based 
approaches that explain the introduction of control processes to help 
understand the professionalization process.  We suggest that cross-
sectional quantitative studies may have severe limitations in assessing the 
level of professionalization achieved.  Future longitudinal quantitative 
studies will provide additional insights relating to the scale and nature of 
the adoption of particular types of controls, structures and systems. 
Implications for private family firms post-MBO/I  
Our rich longitudinal analysis highlights there was no simple consistent 
pattern of association between family exit and the professionalization 
process.  Where family members had a long-term continuing role post-
MBO/I, exit was associated with relaxation of management control 
processes.  For some family members, increased management control 
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processes post-MBO/I constrained ability to act in pursuit of their own 
goals, leading to exit.  
Notably, buyouts can provide a dynamic mechanism to reconcile notions of 
professionalization and stewardship within former private family firms.  This 
suggests family owners not wishing to effect succession may trigger the 
professionalization process by, say, introducing external management.  
External managers can have a key role in triggering a professionalization 
wave concerning the introduction of management controls and processes.  
Family firms seeking to retain some family ethos following exit might 
consider a MBO rather than a MBI.  To realize this choice, family firms may 
need to build a credible tier of non-family management prior to MBO for it 
to be feasible.  Successful firms post-MBO/I can also remove negative 
aspects associated with being a family firm (i.e. free-riding, shirking and 
inequitable treatment).  However, post-MBO/I they need to build on positive 
aspects associated with being a family firm (i.e. loyalty, long-term 
commitment and trust).  MBO/I succession provides a juncture when the 
status quo regarding family, management and ownership interaction can be 
reconfigured.  This may be more difficult to achieve in a linear progression 
to family ownership succession.  Post-MBO/I, there may be resistance to 
being perceived as a family firm because it is ‘less professional’, not helped 
by some conceptualizations distinguishing between family and 
‘professional’ management suggesting family managers are inherently not 
professional (Nordqvist and Hall, 2008). 
Our findings may assist family firm owners, potential MBO/I teams, and 
their advisors and financiers.  Sustainability of elements of stewardship can 
underpin long-term strategy.  Failure to acknowledge this, and over-
emphasis on agency issues, may lead to misunderstanding of the 
motivations of firms, and potentially lead to provision of inappropriate 
advice.  An MBO/I may provide an important transitory form that facilitates 
professionalization.  Advisors and PE financiers may need to structure 
MBO/Is to incorporate longer-term independent ownership rather than exit 
as a trade sale, such as by promoting the extended application of 
secondary MBOs (CMBOR, 2014).  Family firms should carefully consider 
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the nature of PE firms because they differ in terms of their investment exit 
time horizons. 
Limitations and further research 
Limitations provide avenues for further research.  First, research is needed 
using a wider representative sample of former private family firms selecting 
a MBO/I succession route to establish the empirical generalizability of our 
insights.  Second, studies are needed to examine the issues considered 
here in other institutional contexts where notions of agency, stewardship 
and family firm succession may be different, but where MBO/Is play a role 
in succession.  This may add to the development of the contingency 
perspective presented here. Third, our selection of extreme cases focuses 
only on different types of MBO/Is; a further interesting extension would be 
to compare MBO/Is with the development of professionalization in family 
firms that undertake succession to subsequent generations, or external 
management.  Future research might also compare how the 
professionalization process evolves in other succession contexts.  For 
example, some family firm’s effect exit through being acquired by 
corporations, but may be subsequently bought back by the family.  
Similarly, some MBO/Is of family firms are subsequently bought back by 
the family.  Fourth, we did not explore the relationship between firm 
professionalization and buyout performance.  A different research design 
may be required to explore links with firm performance.   
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis highlights  that the process 
of family firm development is not linear.  Presented longitudinal case 
evidence illustrates that it is more complex, and is notably associated with 
waves of professionalization.  This finding opens the way for more general 
studies of professionalization in family firms guided by insights from 
stewardship and agency perspectives. 
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Figure 1: Funnelling Effect of MBO/I on Professionalisation 
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Figure 2: Waves of Professionalization: Drivers and Moderators  
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Table 1 Case Descriptions 
 LOCKS BOXES DUMPS PIPES PLANTS TROLLEYS 
Industry Engineering Paper/print Construction Merchant Horticulture Engineering 
Founded 1965 1963 1979 Pre-1928 1972 1979 
Turnover £m 
1998 : 2005  
4.6 : 3.8 2.5 : not 
known 
20 : n.a. 4 : 18.2** 24 : 30.4 6  
Employees 
1998 : 2005/6 
120 : 99 45 : 25 114 : n.a. 30 : 75 300 : 221 65 : 60 
Deal finance Debt. Debt. Private equity 
(captive). 
Private equity 
(independent). 
Private equity 
(captive). 
Private equity 
(captive). 
Vendor 
succession 
style 
Staged exit: 
Co-operative 
and 
participative. 
Retirement, 
ambassador, 
co-operative. 
Retirement, 
hedonist, 
antagonistic. 
Illness, low 
knowledge 
transfer. 
Retirement, 
co-operative. 
Illness, un-co-
operative. 
Ownership 
changes since 
1998 
Former 
owner’s 
minority 
shares bought 
in 2006. 
2nd MBO in 
2006 
Closed in 
2003. 
Subsidiary 
sold out of 
receivership. 
MBI team 
bought out in 
2000.  
2006 bought 
by competitor. 
MBO team xc 
1 sold in 2001. 
2 VCs bought 
out in 2004/6. 
76% owned by 
MD; 24% by 
FD.  
MBO lead and 
VC bought out 
2001. Other 
MBO member 
bought out 
2003.  
Control 
changes 
 MD retired in 
2002. New 
board 
structure in 
2006. 
Changes in 
directors in 
1999, 2002 
and 2004. MD 
resigned in 
2003.  
New board 
structure in 
2000, 2006. 
Changes in 
directors in 
2005 and 
2007.  
MD replaced 
in 1999. 
Director 
resignations in 
2000, 2001. 
2003 and 
2004. 
New board 
structure 
2004. 
Family 
involvement 
Family vendor 
on board until 
2006. 12.5% 
in trust for 
family. 
None in firm. 
Family own 
business’ 
premises. 
None since 
MBI. 
Son of vendor 
employed until 
2000. 
Son of vendor 
employed as 
director until 
2000. 
Continuing. 
50/50 owned 
by son and 
daughter of 
vendor and 
founder. 
MBO team 
involvement 
All original 
team still 
involved in 
similar roles. 
1 of 4 first 
MBO team in 
2nd MBO. 
MBI lead 
resigned in 
2003. One 
involved till 
liquidation. 
All MBI team 
resigned by 
2000. 
FD was 1 of 4 
in original 
team. 
2 of 4 in 
original team 
Interviewed 
2006? 
MD MD No Financial 
controller 
MD and 
employee 
MD 
Notes: *Last complete financial year pre-MBO/I. **2006 data because 2005 not available. 
n.a. = not available.  MD = Managing director; FD = Financial director; VC= private equity 
company.   
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